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Abstract

I
I

. I
A study was designed to permit quantitative comparisons.
!

~nfluence

between majority influence (conformity) and minority

'
(innovation),.to assess group cohesiveness and behavioral
.

'' .

s.tyle as media tors of each form of influence, and to :test
j

I

.

the hypothesis that whereas majorities produce more manifest
I

influence than minorities, minorities produce.more lajtent
influence than majorities.

The study employed a 2 x '2 x 2
'

I

design, varying source status (majority or minority), group
cohesiveness (high or iow) and behavioral style (high or low
consistency), and assessed influence· on both the manifest
and latent level.

Results confirmed.the greater infllehce

of majorities on a manifest level :but .not of minoritiles on
a latent level.

.

I·
II. .

I

:

i

.I

Conformity and Innovation
Sharon Wolf
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Social influence research has traditionally been cbncerned

.,

with the process of conformity or majority influence (Allen,
.
.
.
1965; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969) and only recently, with ihe
process of innovation (Levine, , 1980; Mos.covic'i, 1976) ,

This

latter research has turned the conformity question around and
asked how and to what extent individuals and active
can influence the majority.

~inbrities

These two forms of influence,

conformity and innovation, have typically been stu'd'ied by
. different investigators, in different experimental
.

·situltio~s.
'
I

Thus, it has been difficult to compare the processes un.derlying
majority and minority influence and to determine the re·lati ve
'

magni tu.de of their effec·ts,

. .

.

.

I

As Doms and Van Avermaet (1980) have pointed out, rhe
most notable difference between the conformity and innoration
paradigms concerns the composition· or the experimental group.
'

.

y,

hereas research on conformity investigates the effects! of a
I

r.1ajority on a single individual,. innovation research lo oks at
1

the effects of a mimrity on a group.·
situation, subjects are exposed not

I

Thus, in the innovation

onl~

I

to the influence of

.

the source but also 'to the reactions of the other targelts. · Qne

I.

· would be to simu
· 1 ate th e dis
· t ,i b u.t ion
·
solution to this problem

of majority and minority· opinions in the experimental group
a nd to assess the. effects of that
individual (Wolf

&

Latam[, 1981).

di~tribution
on a
. .

sirkle

. I

A primary .purpose o:f the

.

•'

2

present rese!"-rch, then, was to study ma.jority and minority
influence in the context of a single experiment, with

a

simulated distribution of opinions in the experimental\group.
I
Because researchers have addressed themselves to :
influence by only one or the other of the factions, they
have arrived at highly divergent explanations of the influence
process (Latane

&

Wolf, 1981).

Explanations of majority

i:nfluence focus on the dependence of individuals up.on the
group either for information or for the material and
psychological benefits .the group can ·provide (Jones
1967).

&

Gerard,

Among the variables thought to increase the dependence

of individuals upon the group, cohesiveness. has re~eived the
most experimental attention (Berkowitz, 1954; Deutsch & Gerard,
1955; Festi.nger, 1950; Thibaut

&

Strickland, 1956).

There is

recent evidence, however, that cohesiveness also mediates
minority influence (Wolf, 1979).

The question that remains

is whether cohesi vene·ss is quantitatively a more ·important
determinant of majority influence than of minority infILuence
(Latane & Wolf, 1981).
Since majorities are seldom in a position of dependence
upon the minority, Moscovici and his colleagues have afgued
that dependence cannot be the .mechanism by which minority
influence operates (Moscovici & Faucheux, 197~; Moscovici &
Nemeth, 1974),

Rather they pro·pose that behavioral st~le,

the consistency and confidence with which the influenc;e source
presents his opinions, is the decisive factor in
influence.

min~~ity

Again it is possible that behavioral stylJ also

J
.

'
'

mediates the effects of majority influence but its rela~tive
I

i_mportance for the two influence sources ·remains to be
determined.

j

A second purpose of the present research, !then,

was to compare the effects of group cohesiveness .a·nd be'havioral

I

·I

style- on conformity and innovation.

'
Moscovici ( 1980) has recently proposed that majori!ty
and

minority influence differ. not quantitatively but qualitatively.
'

·lie suggests that whereas majorities have their
.

on manifest or behavioral

response~,

I

greates~

.

.

impact

I

.

minorities produce.their

strongest influence on.the latent or cognitive-perceptual level
underlying the manifest response.

While Moscovici has;presented
I

'

'

some evidence in favor of this proposition (Moscovici &·Lage,

Mos~ovici

1976;

.

·

& Personnaz, 1980),
other studies havelchallenged
,
I

'its validity (Dams & Van Avermaet, 1980; 'sorrentino; K~ng & Leo,
.

1980·) .

.

. .

I

A final purpose of the present research.' then, iwas to

provide a further test of Moscovici's interesting hyporhesis,

influ~nce

using a new and more realistic measure of latent
(Wolf, 1979).

In summary, the present.study was designed to permit

.'

quantitative comparisons between majority and minoritylinfluence,
I

to assess the relative eff~cts of group cohesiveness ahd

.

I

behavioral style as mediators of each form of influence, and to
test the.hypothesis that whereas majorities produce
influen.ce than minorities,
than majorities.

minoritie~

mo~e

produce more lat:ent

manifest

in~luence

The atudy employed a 2 x 2 x 2 betwelen-subJects

design, varying source status (majority or minority), group
cohesiveness (high or low) and behavioral style (high or low
consistency), and assessed influence on both the manifest and
latent level.

4

-Method

i

Subjects

J

The subjects were 128 female undergraduates -who we(e
paid $J.OO- for their participation in the 90-minute st~dy
\

of "mock juries".

The responses of 32 subjects were. not
1 ~

included in the analyses of the data due to an g priori[

'

.

''

dec.ision to exclude subjects whose ini tia.l
judgments
oriI the
.
.
'

experimental issue .fell outside of· a pres.cribed range, iThus,

i

there were 12 subjects in each of the experimental conditions.

I

Procedure
The subjects were run in

gro~ps

of four and asked·to
'

play the role of jurors deliberating on a .civil case.

funder

the pretext that the study involved verbal and nonverb~l
.

I

communication, they discussed the case by exchanging nbtes
I
i'

and were separated from one another by barriers.
Cohesiveness manipulation,

Prior to .de.li bera tionl. subjects

introduced themselves and talked· about their.interests[ activities
in scho"ol and so forth..

They then indicated their impbession
I
'
of each other "juror" on a scale ranging from -5 (Disl~ke) to
'

+<;(Like).·

Two levels of cohesiveness
.

we~e

created by/later
.

I .

providing subjects with· bogus information ab.out these
Whereas high cohesive subjects learned that
.

.
group

.

~atings.

I .
membrrs had

.

I.

rated one another very posi ti.vely,. low cohesiv'e subjecls learned
that t_he ratings were quite negative.

I.

Following the introductions, barriers were erectJd and
subjects we~e given a trial transcript and an identification
letter from A to D, · In fact, all subjects were B and

IJur~rs

A,

c· and D were represented by means of prewri tten commui:;iica'tions.

I

5
At .this point, subjects rendered an initial judgment o~' the

I

case, which involved· a repairman who had been injured in the
defendant's home.

T_he facts .of the case were weighted to

encourage an initial judgment between 15 and 45 thousand
I
.

I
I

dollars and subjects whose ·judgments were not in that range
'•1ere excluded from the analyses.

,.

Subjects ~egan their:

Source status manipulation.

I

deliberation by writing a firs·t note about the case on! a set
i

of carbon pape_rs (permitting 3 copies of each note to 'be
produced simultaneously; one for each of. the other jur'.ors) .

'

So that the jurors "would know where everyone stood on the
I

case", a bogus distribution of initial judgments was

~rovided
I

for each subject, according to the following sched·ule ,:
.

.

i

Minority Influence Conditions

Majority Influence Coriditions

Juror A: S's judgment + $3,000

Juror.A_: "'$-'-7_,_,....:·0....:0....:0c.___ _- - ' - - - 1

J 1:1ror B: S 's ,judgment.

Juror B: S's judgment

I
I

Juror C: $"..._5_,_,-"0-=0-=0-~-,..--1---

Juror C: "'$_,5_,_,....:o;_;o'-'o'---------

1

Juror D: =$....:2~·~0~0~0~-~-___,I,.--_ __

cTt,i.ror D: S's judgment - $2, 000

I

In effect, this study was concerned w·i th the influence of
I

bogus Juror C on the naive subject B.

In half the

~-oAdi tions,

I

Juror C maintained the majority viewpoint, shared by <jurors A

.

I

and D, of a minimal compensation for the plaintiff.· In the

I

other conditions, Juror C advocated the minority viewpoint,
not shared by any of the other group members, of :a mihimal
·
compensation.

·
I . th e
It may be_ noted that in
bot h condi· t·ions,

.

.

.

1

range_ of majority opinions was $5,.000 and the range oif group
opinions varied from $1J, 000 to $43, 000, depending u.pllon the
subject's initial judgment. ·

..

•

. 6

Consist-ency manipulation.

Afterthe subjects finished

wri t:j.ng their first notes, they were 6.ollected by the Jxperimente;,
who replaced them with prewri tten notes signed by JuroJs A •. c I
and D and redistributed them.

'
After reading t~e notes ostensibiy

written by the other jurors, subjects wrote· a second note about
-

the case.

•

I

.. I

i

'

In all, the deliberation consisted off.our such

exchanges.

!

The' notes from Jurors A and n·raised very general
'

.

'

issues about the case, without referring to a specific iamount
'

of compensation.

J.

The notes from Juror C, on the 0th.er !hand, all

supported her contention that $5,000 was the

I

appropria~e

amount.

The consistency manipulation was contained in the fourth anci ·
final note from Juror C.

In the High Consistent
condiJions,
.
.
I

these notes ended, "I still think $5, 000 is the

faires~ judgment'',
'

whereas in the Low Consistent ·conditions they ended, "] though~
I
$5,000 was the fairest judgment but now I'm not so sure".

. .

..

I

Following the fourth exchange of notes, subjects rendered

I

.

a final, ano_nymous judgment about the case and completed a post1

experimental questionnaire containing checks on the efflectiveness
I

l

of the manipulations and measures assessing the subjec-tis'
perceptions of the other group members.
Before the_ subjects were debrief_ed, they were

.

c:om])lete a short, ostensibly unrelated task.

.

-

ask~d

to

I .
They were told that
I

a lawyer who had been. helping us with the study had asked· us .to
collect some information for him about how people view the
severity of different types and degrees of punishment. ·The
;;ubjects filled out a three-page questionnaire containing a
series of 21-point scales.

On the first page,

I .

include~

.

to divert

·- :•

7
suspicion,_subjects ratecl the severity of different p~ison
terms.

On the second and third pages, they rated the severity.

of different .fines and the usefulness to a defendant of
different compensation awards.

These latter questionjs.

assessed subjects' .·perceptions of the value of money Iand

.

I.

were included as measures of latent influence. ·subje'cts
who
I
'
had been influ.enced by Juror C on a latent level shou'ld
have

I

viewed the fines as more severe and the·compensation awards
as more useful than subjects· who had not been so influenced. '
I

I·

I
I

I

. Results

I•

..

I.

Although the subjects interacted with one another,
they
' .
'

were separated by barriers prior to the introduction ;of the
. i
experimental manipulations and were presumed to be irtdependent·
. :for ·the purpose of statistical .arial;rsis.

I\

Effectiveness of the Manipulations
Cohesiveness.

On 21-point scales, subjects indicated

how much they liked the other members of the jury as la group
and how much they thought
the other group members liked
them.
.
I
.

I

.

Unfortunately, analyses revealed no effects of the cohesiveness

.

.

.

manipulation on these m.easures.

.

I

Al though the presen11

I

manipulation has been used successfully iri previous riesearch

i

(Wolf, 1979), its failure in this .study prevents us .,rom
drawing conclusions about the effects of cohesiveness.
Consistenc,y.

The manipulation of consistency wds highly

.effective in creating diffe.rential perceptions of co

I idence,

I
8

. F (1,88) =. 30,57,
with the group,

Q

4.0001, and willingness to

E (1,88)

=

21.82,

:Q..(

.0001.

compr~mise
I

sh~

When

was

I

consistent, Juror C was seen as more confident of her
opinions (X = 14.4) and less willing to compromise
the group

(x

8.5.and X

= 11.0,

I
w~th

= 6.1) than when she was inconsistent (X =
respectively).

Thus, the consistency

manipulation.resulted in the attributional consequences
necessary to test hypotheses about be·havioral style.
Source status.

On 21-point sca.les, subjects ·indicated

the similarity of each other juror's ini tia·l judgment· to her
own.

Results on these measures indicate that subjects

attended to the information they were given about the
distribution of opinions in the group.

'Since she advocated

. the same· $.5, 000 figure in all conditions, we ex·pected no
effects on .the. measure concerning the similarity of Juror C
and indeed we found none.

The reported judgments of:Jurors

'
A and D, on the other hand, were similar to those of,the
subjects in the Minority Source conditions and different
in the Majori~y Source conditions.

Analyses of vari~nce

rielded main effects for source status on the mea.sur'T concerning
Juror A,£ (1,87)

= 33.02,

12£ .0001, and on the measure

concerning Juror D, E (1,87)

= 39.38,

p

~.0001.

i
J ur9r A

was seen as more similar in the Minority Source conditions
(X = 15.2) than in the Majority Source conditions (X:= 9.1).
!

Likewise, Juror D was seen as more similar in the Minority
I
Source conditions (15.4) than in the Majority Sourcelconditions
(X = 8.4),

I
The manipulation; therefore, was successful.
'I

• e

9

Majority and Minority Influence
Manifes·t influence.

Subjects.

rend~red

t.

compensat'ion

judgments_ both before· and following th.e group. interac:tion.
Since the·final measure was anonymous, a change in judgment
I
in. the. direction of a decreased compensation award re1flects

i

·an internalized acceptance of the position espciused b'y

I

Juror C.

I

I

Analysis of the judgment change data revealed a :main
effect for source status,

E ( 1, 88)

= 16. 34, :Q

<. 0001 .1

When

I

the minimal compensation award advocated by Juror C r 1epresented
i

a majority position in the group, subjects reduced tlteir
judgments by an average of $10,760.

When the

mini~a~,

award

i

advocated by Juror C represented a mino.ri ty opinion i!n the
t

group, on the other hand, the average reduction in jJdgments

.

was only $3, 260.

.

I

.·

co~esi veness.

There were· no effects for group

or for behavioral style, nor were there any interact~ons
involving.those variables,

I

Whi),e the absence of an effect

e~Jerimental
behaviora~ style

for cohesiveness may be due to the failure of the
manipulation, the abse_nce of an effect for
.poses problems for Moscovici' s theory.
Perceived influence.

'

In order to determine whether

I

subjects thought that other gro_up members had changed! their
judgments
over the. course of the deliberation, they were
asked
.
I

.

I

estimate the final judgment of each of the other jurors.

From

_these perceived final judgments the initial judgments, as
reported to subjects on the initial 1 judgment dist~ibufion
sheet, wer·e subtracted, resulting in perceived judgment change
scores. for bogus jurors A,

C and

D.

10

Analyses of variance yielded main effects for sou;rce
status on the measures concerning Juror A, F( ~, 86) IF 48.26,

:Q.(.0001, and Juror D, E (1, 86)

=

17,9·2, 12.<:'...0001.

J

In the

Majority Source conditions, where these bogus jurorsi' initially
.

I

favored a minimal compensation award, they were both: seen as
moving toward a higher judgment.

Juror A was perceiyed to

increase her judgment by $2550, and Juror D, by. $566b.
'
the Minority Source conditions, where these

jur~rs

In

initially

favored a generous compensation award, Juror A was p:er.ceived
to decrease her judgment by $4150., while virtually no change
was seen on the part of Juror D.
Analysis of the measure concerning bogus Juror b revealed·
both a mai.n effect for source status,

E (1,86)

and a main effect for consistency, F (1,86)

=

7,19,

= 32.20,

J:>~.009,

]2.(.0001.

The interaction of these variables was also significant,
F (1,86) = 8.29,

J:>~.005.

'

The pattern of means demonstrates

that when she was highly consistent, Juror C was not' seen as
'
changing her judgment in either the Majority Source :or
the

Minority Source conditions, again attesting to the e'ffecti veness
'
'
of the consistency manipulation. When she was incotjsistent,
on
•

the other hand, Juror C was perceived to increase her judgment
by $2580. in the Majority Source condition and by $i190; .in the
Minority Source condition.
The overall pattern of results on these measures indicates
.

I

that in all conditions, the group was perceived as moving toward
a consensus,

However'· the group was seen as coming closer to

·achieving that consensus in the Majority Source conch tions than
in the Minority Source conditions.

I
I

..
11
.

I

Latent influence.

Embedded.in the "q_uestionnaiJe for
.
•th e pena 1 ty . va 11ue Of
th e 1 awyer " .were measures concerning
a $5,'000. ahd a $25,000 fine and 'the utility value of a
$5,000 and a $25,000 compensation award .. These items

.

I

con_cerned the perception of t.he value of money and were

I

included as measures of latent influence.

,

The $5 ,.000 ·figure!
1

representeq the critical stimulus employed in the orJginal
influence

situ~tion

and $25,000 reflected a normativJ .i..nitiat

judgment in the original influence situation.

SubjeJts who ,
I

had been influenced on a cognitive-perceptual level should
I

I
have viewed the fines a_s more severe and the awards as
more

useful than subjects who had not been so influenced.
Unfortunately·, no significant effects· emerged on any of
these measures, casting doubt upon Moscovici's hypothesis.
I

There are two possible explanations for the lack of results:

.

either no influence

. .

I.

was pfoduced on the laterit level or

.

.

I

·

majorities .and minorities produce comparable levels of such
influence·(cf, Dams & Van Avermaet, 1980).

.

Since we I did not

I

obtain premeasures on these items, nor did we include an

appropriate control condition, we .cannot determine w~ich. of
.
.
Moscovici
.
these a 1 terna·t l.. ves is
correc· t . I .n .any case,
s

I. '

notion that minorities

produce~

latent influence than

majorities receives no support· from the present findings;

Discussion ·
The primary purpose of the. pres~nt. i~vestigat~o1 ~va~ to .
c6mpare the infiuence produced oy maJorities and minorities in

12

a single· e:i_cperiment.

Not unexpectedly, majorities we're found

to be more influential than minorities, at least on Jeasures
of manifest influence.

In fact, a majority of three broduced

about /three time.s as much influence as. a minority o.f rne.
Latane and Wolf (1981) have recently·argued that inflrence
by either a majority or a minority should be a func.tibn of
its size.

The present data

co~firm

their

specu~ationl.

I

There is little evidence that the ·influence prodrced
by e.ither the majority or the minority was mediated by the
I

behavioral style of the influence source.

Although the

'
consistency manipulation resulted in the appropriate attributions,

the present data challenge Moscovici's position that bonsistency

I

is a source of influence pressure,' .

·.

I

Finally, Moscovici's hypothesis that minorities produce
more latent influence than majorities was not supportkd by the
I

present findings.

The question tha.t remains is whethkr ·

I

majorities prodtJce comparable levels of change on thel latent.
level or whether perceptual change is an unlikely reshlt of
influence processes,.
Further research is necessary to

c~arify

j

the

re~hlts

on

the latent influence items and to test the effects of group
cohesiveness as a mediator of majority·and minority infiuence.

I

The present results do, however, ·attest to the viability of
the present paradigm for ·investigating these issues.

I 13

Footnote

I

.

.
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